What you apparently fail to realize is that, at this point, heterodoxy in social science is basically anti marxist by definition.
For me to fail to realize this I would require some evidence to support your claims.
Sure you have some celebrity conservatives, doesn't disprove my point.
Actually it does.
If you are implying that the courses that students choose to enroll in have any major impact on which researchers get grant money or are able to pass peer review, you might be the one without a clue about how universities function.
Enrolment, student feedback and peer review are all important aspects of research considerations and, indeed, professor salary and tenure review. Since undergraduates and post-graduate students comprise the majority of research students, student enrolment
does matter when it comes to grant applications and funding.
Since Melekor's entire argument hinges on a single article by Robert D. Putnam from the Nordic Political Science Association Journal (Scandinavian Political Studies), let's take another, detailed, look at the exact argument and evidence presented therein.
Robert Putnam is Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard university. His writings on the subject of American communities includes,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000), and
Better Together: Restoring the American Community (2003), and recently,
Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis.
In 2006, Putnam gave the Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and
Community in the Twenty-first Century" which is reproduced as a journal article in the
NPSA Journal in 2007.. In this article, Putnam presents evidence that demonstrates that ethnic diversity is one of the correlating factors in the low individual trust thresholds between people living in urban environments in America compared to their small town, ethnically homogenous, rural counterparts. Crucial to Putnam's argument is the concept of "social capital" or the collected networks between individual citizens that enables society to function. Importantly, Putnam concludes that while short-term social capital may be decreased by ethnic diversity (amongst other factors), in the long term, individual citizens "overcome such fragmentation by
creating new, cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities." The short term impacts produce a stronger more robust civil society in the long run.
This is a very important topic that is significant and of interest to all Americans who study urban geography and the development of the polis and civis in immigrant society. During the 1950s and 1960s the hollowing out and ghettoization of American cities as wage earners (and white collar WASPS) moved to the suburbs had a profound impact on the way American cities were perceived following the Second World War. President Johnson's Keynesian War on Poverty and Model Cities initiatives attempted to provide relief and skills training for disillusioned urban youth impacted by the economic and military crisis of the 1950s and 60s, as income inequality increased and poverty became the state of affairs for millions of Americans living in cities. The scale of the problem and the required solution was so immense, however, that in 1965 the Model Cities problem could only be applied to neighbourhoods of 15,000 people or less. The $390 million dollar program represent only a tiny proportion of funds allocated the overall Housing and Urban Development, and the program was plagued by interdepartmental conflicts. Riots sparked by racial tension (the LA Watts riots of 1965 are a case in point) demonstrated the reaction to ghettoization of urban blacks as white moved to the suburbs. Although the civil rights movement had made political gains for blacks in America, the daily life of impoverished ghettos, and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. demonstrated that life for blacks in urban America was still dangerous and indeed segregated. School reforms as a result of legal cases brought against segregationist districts produced ongoing tensions throughout the decade. Violent crime rates rose in major urban centres in the 1960s as access to firearms increased and this led to the situation in 1972 when fear of violence in urban centres was highest for impoverished blacks and whites, as the middleclass continued to flee to the suburbs. In 1973 the federal government, in response to a corruption scandal, placed a moratorium on federal low income housing assistance, a situation that was made worse by the 1974 recession (which bankrupted New York in 1975). Black on black crime was prevalent, impoverishments rates were high amongst the elderly, school dropouts, and small businesses in the cities, and in 1971 Nixon terminated the Model Cities program. By 1976 Gerald Ford was in the process of dismantling Johnson's Great Society reforms, and the urban crisis continued unabated. Carter attempted to reverse the 70s decline with his 1978 Urban Policy Report. The findings demonstrated that increasing environmental pollution, aging city infrastructure, and the need to modernize communications, sanitation and transportation had all contributed to the situation as it stood at the beginning of the 1980s. Federal assistance to urban housing and development was further curtailed by Reagan in 1981. By the mid 1970s,t he average income of a family moving to an urban environment was $14,000, (about $65,000s in todays money). The average urban household was earning $12,000 annually (57,000). Welfare recipients were overwhelmingly clustered in the cities. Billions of dollars were spent on infrastructure projects during the 1970s and 1980s to bring the urban societies up to modern technological and energy standards, however, Reagan's 1982 National Urban Policy Report recommended cutting investment in urban renewal so that funds could be reallocated to light industrial developments in the suburbs, this was combined with increased relative taxation on those making less than $10,000 annually, which directly impacted standards of living in the cities (those making more than $80,000 a year received 64 billion in tax cuts). By 1983, 15% of the US population was impoverished (up from 12% in 1978), the vast majority concentrated in the cities. Political power shifted to the suburbs, with the suburban districts controlling 131 seats in Congress in 1975. Transnational market forces in the 1980s and the acceleration of technological change in the form of computerization, xerox and internet communication, revolutionized the business and finance sectors concentrated in the large cities. This trend further pushed blue collar labourers to the margins as American manufacturing was challenged by rising automation and organization in Japan, Europe, and the emerging economies in China and India. New emphasis on service sector labour in the cities and other political-economic transformations (treaties, supranational blocs, changing security situation, etc) produced a relative decline in US manufacturing as outsourcing and competition increased at the global scale. Large financial sectors such as the banking and stock market sectors in New York became even more internationalized as global trade expended.
One result of these changes was the dramatic increase in the size of the "commons" and the opportunities for market exchange within and between cities. Traditional identities rooted in
place were devastated by the demographic migrations and diasporas of the 1960s and 70s. Huge urban metropolises, such as London, Seul, Tokyo, Mexico City, New York and Las Angeles became the hubs for international finance and energy markets, with coincidental impact for the urban populations, especially lowerclass unskilled labour, which found the ground shifting beneath its feet as the economy modernized. The new global Complex Interdependence meant that market forces acting in the transnational periphery could radically impact living standards in local neighbourhoods.
So what is Putnam's contribution to this very interesting history of American urban geography? Putnam's research focuses on the way traditional urban linkages have evolved in the new environment: from religion to libraries and industry, to the internet, Putnam has addressed the new urban geography from a number of angles. In his 2003 publication,
Better Together: Restoring the American Community, Putnam looks at how local stakeholders have managed to evolve as American urban and rural life transitions. Putnam is particularly interested in the development of
trust between individuals and communities, and how those networks of trust are established and maintained. Putnam is a leading advocate of research on the new field of Social Capital, that emerged during the 1990, which attempts to index and explore the immensely complex interrelationships that produce social networks at the local and individual level. Interest in social capital development and growth has generated studies from the UN and World Trade Organization. The essence of the social capital theory is that neighbourhoods produce real standard of living improvements when connections between individuals and community networks are maintained. Naturally, an important qualification for the growth of these networks in urban, sub-urban and rural communities is the development of trust between individual citizens. Social capital is measured without regard to the goals of community, for example, the KKK, or Al Qaeda, notes Putnam, are both examples of successful social capital in that the members share a common outlook and socio-political objectives. More mundane examples are a bowling league, food coop, labour union, and so on. Putnam identifies two social interactions crucial to the development of social capital: social BONDING and social BRIDGING. In the former, social capital is built by intra-group integration and the tightening of bonds between related communities. In the latter, social capital is developed by inter-group linkages as communities and individuals reach out and cooperate with each other. Putnam notes that strong communities will represent both bonding and bridging linkages, as communities exclusively bonded become segregated and insular (he uses the example of Bosnia), whereas pluralist societies, to succeed, require the development of strong bridging social capital. In the second book, Putnam pointed to the example of UPS as an organization that was highly socially bonded (and predominately white and male) in the 1960s, but that successfully diversified and created bridging social capital in the 1990s and 2000s.
It is the latter point that is the essence of Putnam's lecture, that Melekor referenced. As Putnam observes, BONDING capital is easier to develop (as in-groups tend to stick together) than BRIDGING, and although bonding produces short-term benefits, bridging tends to produce longer-term strength in terms of social capital. Putnam states clearly that the linkages involved in any description of social capital are profoundly complex, representing a vast range of influences, from historical trends, market forces, race relations, immigration and emigration, labour organization, religious influence, wealth and poverty, geographical space, crime rates, access to education and so on. Putnam's 2000 book,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000), explored the disconnection in social capital that occurred in the 1960s, 70s and 80s as a result of some of the trends described above. In this monograph, Putnam concludes that the disconnection was caused mainly by technological transformation, income disparity, urban expansion and sprawl, and generational changes in the american society. Putnam observed that social disintegration was not restricted to urban centres, but was in fact increasing in the homogenous suburban developments as well. Putnam cited findings that civil engagement was falling across the board, not only in the urban but also in the rural communities. "Virtually no corner of American society has been immune to this anticivic contagion. It has affected men and women; central cities, suburbs, and small towns; the wealthy, the poor, and the middle class; blacks, whites, and other ethnic groups; people who work and those who don't; married couples and swinging singles; North, South, both coasts, and the heartland." (p. 247). Putnam notes that age and education seem to be the major correlating factors: older people are more generally likely to be socially engaged than the youth. (p. 249). Clearly, one of the factors that produced this trend, is the questioning of state legitimacy by the youth. The Cold War greatly damaged state prestige and legitimacy, in a fashion similar to what happened during the First World War, and this process was then compounded by environmental degradation, increased income inequality, and urban decay during the second half of the 20th century in America. Obviously economic crisis and political corruption further reduced trust thresholds amongst the population in general (who would trust the government after the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, let alone, Snowden?). The older, more trusting generation, is also significantly
less educated than the younger generations. Putnam points to studies that indicate that
wealth and financial security became significantly more important for the Generation X and Baby Boomers than any sense of community or environmental engagement during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Putnam presents a wealth of evidence that supports his case that there is a complex fusion of pressures and social, political, and economic factors that have produced the "less trusting" generation X and Y (the so-called millennials, or "Teflon generation").
So how does Putnam's "Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century" fit into this framework and research? Putnam's objective is to integrate the ethnic diversity and immigration debate into the social-capital framework. Putnam states clearly that he believes that immigration will continue in the future, and that the result will be more ethnic diversity in communities. He sees these as a net-positive, as the benefits of diversity are proven by the history of the United States and its enshrined founding principles of individual liberty and diversity of thought and religious freedom and freedom of association. Putnam makes the case that in the short term, the development of social capital is inhibited by immigration and ethnic diversity. The challenge of social bridging is here essential, as "successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities." (p. 138-9). Putnam observes that immigration itself is a complex factor in terms of social capital construction, and is clearly not always going to lead to a negative outcome: he points to the example of Canadian immigration to the United States, for example, but also notes that race relations (notably, black-white relations) are not linked to immigration, considering that "the ancestors of most African-Americans have been in the United States longer than the ancestors of most white Americans". (p. 140). Putnam observes that ethnic diversity will continue to increase, even if immigration were completely stopped, due to birthrate demographics. Putnam states that, despite the negative impact of ethnic diversity on social capital, there is also a positive correlation: diversity increases creativity, citing the example of America's Nobel Laureats and National Academy of Science Members, Academy Award movie directors, and others who have accounted for "three to four times as many" awards then native born Americans. He cites examples from business and education that demonstrate that diversity increases creativity. Putnam notes that immigration is "associated with more rapid economic growth" as well. He argues that immigration in general tends to cause an increase in gross national income, despite negative impacts on low-wage native workers. Putnam observes that immigration is critical to prevent a demographic crisis caused by the retirement and aging of the baby boomers.
Putnam now turns to the evidence that immigration and ethnic diversity have a negative impact on social capital. Putnam identifies two major schools of thought on this subject: contact and conflict theories. Contact, he observes, tends to argue that increased integration with diverse ethnicities reduces ethnocentric attitudes and fosters solidarity. Conflict, on the other hand, tends to suggest that diversity produces "out-group distrust and in-group solidarity." Putnam says he believes the evidence supports the conflict theory, and points to a range of studies that suggest that "diversity and solidarity are negatively correlated" in the workplace, in terms of car-pooling, prisoner dilemma games, and the example of the Union Army during the American Civil War, which Putnam contends suffered higher desertion rates in heterogeneous units (in terms of age, hometown, occupation). Putnam now gets to the heart of his thesis: "Advocates of the conflict and contact theories clearly disagree about the balance of the empirical evidence, but in their shared focus on ethnocentric attitudes, they share one fundamental assumption - namely that in-group trust and out-group trust are negatively correlated. I believe this assumption is unwarranted...". Putnam's absolutely critical point here is the distinction, again, between BONDING and BRIDGING social capital. He notes that academics tend to assume that the two exist in a zero-sum arrangement, where if a group has a high in-group bonding value, it must therefore have a poor out-group bridging value and vice versa. Putnam is utterly unequivocal that this is not the case. He states clearly: "... high bonding might well be compatible with high bridging, and low bonding with low bridging," thus, "in the United States... whites who have more non-white friends
also have more white friends."
Putnam takes to task the empirical studies of in-groups vs out-group relations, arguing that it is a mistake to assume that there is an inherent negative correlation between in-group/out-group distinction, so out-group attitudes might not necessarily be a reflection of ethnocentrism, likewise, in-group attitudes might not be a reflection of xenophobia. Putnam now proposes his "constrict theory" model, where he intends to demonstrate that diversity can produce a reduction in both in-group and out-group solidarity. The survey this thesis is based on is the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey conducted in 2000, in which 30,000 were surveyed, as well as 3,000 nationally representative individuals from 41 various urban, rural and suburban communities. Putnam notes that the locations selected represent broad variations in size, economic profile, region, education, and other demographic and geographic factors. Significantly, for this lecture, he is interested in the variation in ethnic diversity in the cities, from Los Angeles and San Francisco "among the most ethnically diverse human habitations in history," to rural South Dakota "95% white". Putnam selected the 2000 survey because it coincided with a national census, providing additional socio-economic data for analysis. Putnam begins by describing the ethnicity trust index from large metropolitan areas and small homogenous rural locations. At first the findings, which seem to correlate to "low trust" in the urban centres, is taken as evidence in support of Conflict theory, but Putnam states the situation is more complicated than that. Putnam argues that the evidence suggests that homogenous rural communities are inherently more trusting than heterodox urban areas, regardless of ones ethnicity. People in diverse communities (mainly, large cities) simply do not trust
anyone as much as people in homogenous suburbs or rural communities. The nuance that Putnam is demonstrating is that "social isolation" (as correlated to trust) is more prevalent in diverse communities (nominally, large cities), than in homogeneous suburbs or "rural west virginia". Putnam then goes on to note the correlation between areas of ethnic diversity and other trends, notably, "less happiness and lower perceived quality of life," and "less expectation that others will cooperate to solve dilemmas of collective action," amongst others. Interestingly, Putnam also observes that heterozygous communities tend to be more politically engaged and educated, although less likely to vote. It is very clear that Putnam is not suggesting that diversity is the
absolute cause for these effects, but rather is one amongst many factors that contributes to the decline in social capital in American communities since the Second World War.
Putnam goes on to add that diversity did not effect all dimensions of social capital. He cites the examples of religious activity, which he observes is "essentially uncorrelated with diversity," one imagines appreciation for professional sports, could be another example (the bowling league). Putnam reemphases that aspects of political engagement correlate
positively to diversity. He makes it clear that diversity is not the cause of racial conflict, but rather, seems to be a factor involved in causing decline in social capital (as measured by trust), "regardless of the colour of their skin"- a state of affairs that also correlates with the decline of America's urbanites in the late 20th century. Putnam now explores some of the objections to this theory, notably, the point i've been making about the correlation between low trust and
urbanism and urban decline in general (with higher rates of poverty, lower educational standards, etc). Putnam uses the census data to explore these correlations. Putnam observes that, yes, in fact, "age (younger people less trusting), ethnicity (blacks and Hispanics are less trusting) and socioeconomic class (the educated, the well-off, and homeowners are more trusting)." This is significant in that cities, since the 1960s, have been largely occupied by young, diverse, middle and lower-middle class rentiers, who, according to the research, are likely to be low-trusting compared to their rural and suburban counterparts. Interestingly, though, Putnam feels the evidence is not restrictive to age. In addition to "ethnic diversity" therefore, Putnam proposes that crime and poverty (and income inequality) be taken in account, and he argues that there is a clear correlation between all three factors (especially in an urban environment after 1980). Putnam acknowledges on page 155 that the study is not complete, and that he was restricted by budget considerations from conducting the truly comprehensive and detailed study that would have further explored the distinctions between ethnicities, and socio-economic status (p. 156) in heterogeneous societies: "people who live in neighbourhoods of greater economic inequality also tend to withdraw from social and civi life." (p. 157). Putnam is unambiguous that diversity is a correlative effect, but not contingent on, economic inequality.
